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BAR BRIEFS
This ruling being predicated "upon whether a third party would have
reasonable grounds for believing the agent had authority given by the
principal, and this a question of actual fact and not mere title." Anderson
v. Northwestern Fire & M. Ins. Co., 51 N. D. 917, 201 N. W. 514 (1924).
True, the insurer may limit the powers of the agent, but these limitations
must be. made known to third parties dealing with the agent, and the
principal is bound by the acts of the agent when such acts are within the
apparent scope of the agent's authority. Michigan Idaho Lumber Co. v.
Northern Fire & M. Ins. Co., 35 N. D. 244, 16 N. W. 130 (1916) ; Union
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U. S. 222, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L. Ed. 617
(1872); St. Paul Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Parsons, 47 Minn. 352, 50 N. W.
240 (1891).
In the principal case an ostensible agency relationship arose, for the
insured was under the impression that the agent was the company to all
intents and purposes; hence, the insurer was estopped to deny the agent's
apparent authority to accept the application and waive the payment of
the first premium, Wieland v. St. Louis Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
146 Minn. 255, 178 N. W. 499 (1920) ; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Walter, 51 Neb.
182, 70 N. W. 938 (1897). And the taking of an oral application, when
accepted, binds the insurer, notwithstanding that the policy has not yet
been issued or delivered. Anderson v. Northwestern Fire & M. Ins. Co.,
51 N. D. 917, 201 N. W. 514 (1920); 26 C. J. 54; 44 C. J. S. 96.
In the instant case, where the policy had been issued and forwarded
to the agent but had not been delivered by the agent to the insured, the
defendant company contended that the policy had not been delivered, therefore the contract of insurance was not effective. "In the absence of other
evidence to show assent of the company to the making of a contract of
insurance, delivery of the policy must be shown." Newark Machine Co. v.
Kenton Ins. Co., 50 Ohio St. 549, 35 N. E. 1060, 22 L.R.A. 768 (1893).
Thus, it may be stated as a general rule, "that delivery is necessary
to the validity of a written instrument, nevertheless, the actual delivery
or non-delivery of a policy of insurance is not always the final test of a
contract of insurance, . . .." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitman, 75 Ohio
St. 312, 79 N. E. 459, 9 Ann. Cas. 218 (1906) ; Herring v. American Ins.
Co., 123 Iowa 553, 99 N. W. 130 (1904) ; Pruitt v. Great Southern Life Ins.
Co., 202 La. 527, 12 So. (2d) 261 (1942). Accordingly, on the facts of the
principal case, the policy had been issued and the act of issuance bound
the insurer; since the issuance, unequivocally, was indicative of the assent
of the company to the making of the contract of insurance, thus the actual
delivery of the policy to the insured was immaterial.
DOUGLAS B. HEEN.

DIVORCE-ALIMONY-POWER OF COURTS TO DECLINE LIENS. A divorce
decree was awarded granting the plaintiff-wife a specific amount of money
payable monthly until further order of the court. The court further ordered
that, "she have and is awarded judgment against the defendant for said
sums and debts as aforesaid, all in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant and such judgment is made a lien upon any and all properties
of and belonging unto him and any and all earnings which he may hereafter attain or acquire." The action under discussion was then brought by
the husband to clear title to land owned by him, and to test the lien declared
on the land by the court in the divorce decree.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in the syllabus stated "While
the district court, in an action for divorce, has p>ower to decree alimony to
the wife and to require future payments thereof for an indefinite period,
subject to the power of the court to change the amounts and terms of
payment, the district court has no power to decree that the provision for
such payments is a lien upon all the property of or belonging to the
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husband and upon any and all moneys which he may hereafter attain
and acquire as such provision is not a definite liability or a judgment for
a specific amount so that it may become a lien upon the husband's
property." The court also maintained that equity courts in North Dakota
have no inherent power to decree alimony in a divorce proceeding unless
specifically authorized by the statute. Leifert v. Wolfer, N. D., 24 N. W.
(2d.) 690 (1945).
N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §35-0104 provides that: "a judgment which,
in whole or in part, directs the payment of money," may be docketed and
that: "judgment shall be a lien on all the real property, except the homestead, of every person against whom any such judgment is rendered,
which he may have in any county in which such judgment is docketed at
the time of docketing or which he thereafter shall acquire in such county,
for ten years from the time of docketing the same in the county in which
it was rendered." There is also a provision that: "The court may require
either party to give reasonable security for providing maintenance or
making any payments required under the provisions of this chapter, and
may enforce the same by appointment of a receiver or by any other
remedy applicable to the case..." N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §14-0525.
In Gaston v. Gaston, 144 Cal. 542, 46 Pac. 609 (1896), the court said,
referring to a statute similar to North Dakota's, that a statute authorizing
the court, in a divorce proceeding, to require the husband to give reasonable
security for providing maintenance, and giving the court the power to
enforce its order, should not be so construed as to abridge the equitable
power of the court to make the maintenance a lien or charge upon the real
estate of the husband.
"A lien is created by contract of the parties or by operation of law."
N, D. Rev. Code (1943) §35-0104.
An example of a lien created by contract of the parties is found in
Gray v. Gray, 24 N. D. 89, 176 N. W. 7 (1919), where the parties signed
an agreement that the property of the husband should be incumbered by a
lien in favor of the wife to secure the payment of alimony.
A majority of the state courts regard a decree for alimony as a debt
of record in the same manner as any other judgment for money. Glenn,
Creditors Rights, 1915 §71 n. 2, Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62
Pac. 125 (1900), Conrad v. Everick, 50 Ohio St. 476, 35 N. E. 48 (1893).
The judgment itself is a lien upon the real property of the debtor. Hulbert
v. Hulbert, 216 N. Y. 430, 111 N. E. 70, L.R.A. 1916 D 661, Ann. Cas. 1917
D 180 (1916).
eir
The case under discussion hinges on the power of the courts and tl,
jurisdiction with regard to divorce decrees.
"Jurisdiction in matters
relating to divorce and alimony is conferred by statute, and the power of
the courts to deal with such matters must find support in the statute or it
does not exist." Sate ex rel. Hagert v. Templeton ect. 18 N. D. 525, 123
N.W. 383, 25 L.A.R. (N.S.) 234 (1909). Justice Burke, dissenting in McLean
v.McLean, 69 N. D. 665. 290 N. W. 913 (1940). said. "there is no question
but that the trial court in a divorce action has the power, when a divorce is
granted, to make an equitable distribution of the property of the parties
(14-0524) and to impress the property of a party to the action with a lien
to enforce phyment of the sums such party was directed to pay the
other (14-0525)."
DEAN WINKJER.
BASTARDY-WHO MAY INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS. A pregnant mother in
consideration of a sum of money released the putative father from all
liability for support and maintenance. The child, two years old, now sues
the putative father for support and education and to have the release
made between mother and defendant set aside. Held, neither common law
nor the statutes of New York or New Jersey authorize a suit by the child

